After the deportation of the eight Jewish refugees, fears among the Jewish community rose. There were rumours about plans to send all of Finland’s Jews to Germany (Rautkallio, Aseveljeys 126). The fears surfaced again in the summer of 1944, when the Soviet forces launched a massive attack, and Finland turned to Germany for assistance (Torvinen, Kadimah 160). Some Jewish soldiers went as far as making arrangements to leave the country in case something went wrong and the Germans took over in Finland (Rautkallio, Aseveljeys 160). The Jewish congregation in Helsinki had also taken precautions (Jakobson 374; Torvinen, Kadimah 160). The annual report of the congregation for 1944 states that the Jewish community in Finland had “never before been threatened by such a great danger” 3 (Torvinen, Kadimah 158).
Apparently at least the Helsinki congregation believed there were demands (Torvinen, Kadimah 143), and gratitude to the Finnish authorities was expressed accordingly: On December 6, 1944, on the Finnish Independence Day, in a memorial service held in the Helsinki synagogue to honour the Jewish soldiers who had died in the wars, Rabbi Elieser Berlinger thanked Finland for treating Jews equally “in spite of pressure” 4 (Torvinen, Kadimah 162). A similar statement was made in an international Jewish conference in October 1944: Finland was referred to as “the only country under the influence of Nazism that resisted all pressure and refused to deprive its Jewish citizens of their constitutional freedom and rights” 5 (Helsingin Sanomat in Torvinen, Kadimah 164).
The claims about German demands can be traced back to at least two sources, Friedrich Pantzinger and Felix Kersten, and are in close connection with two events: Arno Anthoni’s business trip to Berlin in April 1942 and SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler’s visit to Finland in the summer of the same year.
Pantzinger (sometimes spelled Panzinger), who was the chief of the Fifth Administrative Bureau of the German security police at the time, gave his version of the events when he was interrogated in 1947. According to him, Jews in Finland were discussed during Anthoni’s visit, and the Gestapo expressed its wish to have the Jews under German control. Anthoni was supposedly eager to have them handed over and sent to concentration camps, and had even brought a list of them with him. However, it is questionable whether Pantzinger’s account can be trusted, for he also made claims that can be proven inaccurate, e.g. he stated that the plan was indeed carried out, which certainly is not true (Rautkallio, Holocaust 156–58).
Felix Kersten, a Finnish citizen, was Heinrich Himmler’s masseur, and accompanied him on the visit to Finland. According to Kersten, Himmler arrived in Finland with the intention of demanding the handing over of Finland’s Jews. In case of refusal, he was prepared to threaten to halt food supplies from Germany. Kersten himself had saved the situation by making up excuses about “technical problems” (Kersten in Torvinen, Pakolaiset 181–84). However, Kersten’s reliability has been questioned (Rautkallio, Holocaust 164–69 and Aseveljeys 171–73; Torvinen, Pakolaiset 184 and Kadimah 158–59), and Jakobson points out he did use his position to help persecuted people, but also had the bad habit of twisting the truth in order to appear a hero (372).
There is also another event that is sometines mentioned in connection with Himmler’s visit. Kustaa Vilkuna, the chief Finnish censor at he time, revealed in 1954 that during the visit the contents of Himmler’s briefcase were photographed (in Rautkallio, Holocaust 168–69), and it has been claimed that among the contents was a list of Finland’s Jews (Torvinen, Pakolaiset 184; Smolar 148). Vilkuna, however, emphasises he “had nothing to do with the business” (in Rautkallio, Holocaust 168–69), and Rautkallio points out that though the story has spread, there is no evidence to support it (Rautkallio, Holocaust 169).
Prime Minister Rangell’s account of the visit is that Himmler brought up the question of Jews in Finland once. Rangell then told him they were decent people and that there was no Jewish question in the country. That was the only time the matter was discussed (Rangell in Rautkallio, Holocaust 168).
What is more, German demands seem unlikely in light of what happened in 1943. After the extradition of the eight Jewish refugees and the reactions that followed, Wipert von Blücher, the German envoy in Helsinki, expressed his concern over the negative effects the German racial policy might have on the opinions of the sensitive Finnish people (in Suominen 207). At the same time, a report arrived from Germany which instructed him to inform the Finnish government that Jews of foreign nationalities would no longer have special status in territories under German rule. The government was thus given a chance to arrange the safe return of Finnish Jews residing in the Third Reich (Luther in Suominen 89). The matter concerned only a few Finnish citizens, and yet the Germans repeatedly urged the Finnish authorities to make sure everyone had returned (Rautkallio, Aseveljeys 119–121). If the Nazis were as eager to send Finnish Jews to concentration camps as Kersten claimed, why was such an effort made to protect these few people?
Despite the fact that Finland’s Jews were listed on the Wannsee protocol, which was drawn up in January 1942, when the decision about the final solution of the Jewish question was made (Torvinen, Kadimah 139), the Finnish Jews were, as Rautkallio concludes, an exception in Nazi Germany’s Jewish policy. Finland was simply too precious an ally for Germany to jeopardise the relationship by bringing up the Jewish question, especially since the government had firmly expressed that all demands were out of the question (Rautkallio, Holocaust 258–59).
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